Using a search-theoretic model where education's productive role is endogenous, we study the theoretical ramiÞcations of separating human capital accumulation from educational investment decisions. Stationary equilibria exist with productivity disparities in the educated workforce, despite ex-ante homogeneity. This represents a market failure with over-investment in education but under-investment in skill, coexisting with better outcomes due to a strategic complementarity. Two elements affect market premia to skill and incentives to exploit education's productive role: degrees imperfectly communicate productivity, and contract imperfections allow the unskilled to capture some ability rents. Policy implications are explored.
Introduction
What is the purpose of education? The insight provided by economic theory is tied to two distinct notions. Education has a productive role in augmenting human capital (Becker, 1964) . It also has an identiÞcation (or signaling) role in labor markets suffering from informational asymmetries (Arrow, 1973 , Spence, 1973 , and Stiglitz, 1975 . If schooling marginal costs are inversely related with imperfectly observable innate abilities, the more able acquire more schooling to signal their pre-existing higher productivity.
A large literature has exploited these notions in trying to account for the observed heterogeneity in workers' productivity or educational attainment (see the surveys of Hanushek, 1986 , Owen, 1995 , or Weiss, 1995 . While the models proposed are often very different, they all share a common feature. When equilibrium productivity disparities hinge on skill heterogeneity, the latter is either simply assumed, or it is rooted, solely or partially, in exogenous heterogeneity factors. 2 We develop intuition for two theoretical questions that naturally arise. The Þrst is positive.
Setting aside exogenous heterogeneity elements, can we pin down a simple and intuitive economic mechanism that can account for equilibrium differences in educational attainment and skills? The answer is yes, when we model achievement while in school (i.e. human capital accumulation) as an economic decision that is complementary to schooling investment choices. The catalyzing factor is informational asymmetries. Given this, the second question is normative. Should policy makers think of fostering skill accumulation as a mere problem of affordability of education? The answer is no.
Our approach is to provide simple, albeit rigorous, theoretical examples. To do so, we construct a general equilibrium search-theoretic model (sections 2 and 3) where education's productive role is endogenous. Exploitation of an educational opportunity does not passively augment productivity, as 2 Factors can be pre-existing and payoff-relevant, as the innate abilities' heterogeneity of Arrow (1973) or Kremer and Maskin (forthcoming) . They can be pre-existing but payoff-irrelevant factors, as the observable immaterial features (e.g. color of skin) of Moro and Norman's (2000) statistical discrimination model. Factors can be intrinsic to the skill acquisition process, as the random factors in Lazear and Rosen (1981) . Finally, heterogeneity factors can be a mixture of the above, as in Weiss (1983) . skill accumulation requires a complementary effort. The market, however, cannot always recognize skill, and contractual imperfections let the less efficient workers capture some productivity rents of skilled workers. These frictions are key in generating skill heterogeneity across educated workers.
The intuition is simple. Should a student invest in skills? Not if it is easy to extract some ability rents of the more productive workers.
The contribution is twofold. On the positive side, we complement the theoretical literature on the determinants of skill heterogeneity. In sections 4 and 5, we illustrate how differences in education and skill arise despite the absence of ex-ante heterogeneity, both productivity -relevant and not. This, we show, is a market failure stemming from a strategic complementarity in the private investment in skill, and the presence of informational asymmetries.
On the normative side, we exploit the theoretical analysis to develop intuition on the role that incentives to academic achievement have on investment in education and student performance.
Such intuition, in turn, generates suggestions for some aspects of education policy. First, it indicates a key role for the provision of incentives to educational achievement, both from the market and from within the educational system itself. 3 Second, it reveals the importance of policies directed at diminishing informational asymmetries, for example by raising education standards or the informativeness of academic certiÞcates. Third, it suggests that an increased public effort to lower the private cost of education may be ineffective in raising the workforce's skill level when not complemented by incentives to student performance.
Prior research has identiÞed factors capable of generating market failures in the acquisition and provision of productive skills. 4 Our contribution is to provide a simple theory that builds intuition on how informational asymmetries and lack of incentives to academic achievement may contribute to generating such failures. 5 We show how, when education's productive role is endogenized, the economy may get stuck in equilibria with enough schooling but not enough skills from a social welfare perspective. In contrast, in virtually all treatments (of which we are aware) where an 3 This is prominent in the U.S. debate (e.g. see the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce, 1990) . 4 In sorting models of education differences in innate abilities and informational asymmetries may generate a wedge between private and social returns to skills (Weiss, 1995) . Firms' imperfect competition for labor, individuals' credit constraints, and matching externalities are also factors that may lead to market failures (Booth and Snower, 1995) . 5 Both are important themes of the U.S. education debate. Research has focused on the economic impact of education standards (Costrell, 1994 , Betts, 1998 , and there is evidence that employers pay little attention to grades, perhaps because of their small and decreasing information content (Owen, 1995). individual's education is a source of externality, under-investment in skills is necessarily associated with under-investment in education.
To start, we outline the model's features to better contrast it with related work.
A Snapshot of the Model
We consider a search-theoretic environment where anonymous workers can form short-lived productive matches. This allows us to focus on the role of information frictions in guiding education and skill investment decisions. Education has a productive role in that it is the only means to acquire productivity-enhancing skills, but it does not have a signaling role because agents are assumed exante homogeneous. Each agent makes an initial education/skill choice, then sells her labor in a market vexed by information frictions. By investing in education the agent earns a recognizable degree, but additional effort is required to gain imperfectly observable skills. Thus, unlike sorting models of education, the degree cannot signal innate abilities but only certiÞes the educational opportunity has been undertaken. Realizing that not all students have chosen to augment their productivity, the market forms expectations on the probability that educated workers are skilled.
We focus on economies where skills are essential in expanding allocations. To enhance earnings over autarky, agents must market skilled labor to Þrms. This is modeled as a random matching process where Þrms are temporary two-agent partnerships in which only the use of skilled labor generates surplus. Imperfections in the contracting process, however, affect market returns from 'mismatched' partnerships: the less productive agent captures some of her partner's ability rents.
The acquisition of skill thus generates a positive externality to partners of any productivity, so everyone tries to team up with skilled workers. This causes adverse selection since the unskilled do not sort themselves out of the market.
We study all the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of this environment. Equilibrium skill heterogeneity is linked to the use of mixed strategies. The contracting imperfections create an incentive to exploit the informational asymmetry stemming from degrees' ineffectiveness in attesting skill. The value of a degree hinges on how easily its possession allows an inefficient agent to free-ride off someone more productive. Agents thus may engage in strategic behavior, investing in education without exploiting its productive role, to mimic skilled workers. In fact, the incentive to do so grows the lower is the private cost of education. What's more, free-riding behavior not only diminishes aggregate productivity, but it also generates imperfect correlation between education and skill.
This creates an additional negative externality which works its way though market expectations, as skilled workers may refuse to join Þrms of uncertain productivity. This further reduces the marketability of skills.
The extent of market imperfections and education costs (exogenous), and the heterogeneity in both education and productivity of the educated workforce (endogenous), are key in determining the equilibrium education/skill choices of the representative agent, as they affect the market premium to skill. Because the returns to skill depend on the number of 'good jobs' expected to be available in the economy, there are strategic complementarities in education choices. These can generate market failures with low skill accumulation and productivity heterogeneity.
Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a constant population comprised of a measure one continuum of Þnitely-lived ex-ante identical unskilled agents. They produce a homogeneous perishable and divisible good, have identical preferences that are linear in consumption, and discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). At every date the agent faces probability 1 − π of exiting the economy at the beginning of the following period, being replaced by a newborn unskilled agent. There is a costly educational opportunity which allows agents to permanently enhance their productivity at the beginning of life. They can acquire a productivity -irrelevant degree and, contingent on that, can invest additional resources to earn productivity-enhancing skills. Earning a degree, via a process we call schooling, generates disutility c d > 0. The acquisition of skills generates additional disutility c s > 0. These decisions are made simultaneously, and the outcome is instantaneous. 6 Thus, an agent can be unskilled, with low-productivity, or skilled, with high-productivity, in a state denoted by i = n if the agent has no degree, i = d if she has a degree but no skills, and i = s if she is skilled (and has a degree).
Following the initial education/skill choice agents enter a market where they can promote their 6 A natural interpretation of c d is the value of forgone unskilled wages, while c s captures the existence of a quantiÞable level of disutility from supplying effort while in school. Introducing innate productivity differentials, or letting skilled agents further augment their productivity, would increase the dimensionality of the state space, complicating the exposition but providing little additional insight. This is also why we let the process of education be instantaneous (as is done, for example, in Lazear and Rosen, 1981, or Costrell, 1994 
− u i be the surplus obtained by i in a match with k ∈ {n, d, s}. It is the difference between i's utility from eating her share of the Þrm's output, g i (i, k) , minus autarkic utility. We assume complementarities in joint production with skills, and increasing returns in the Þrm's skill level. The key implication is that only skills can generate market surplus, higher in self-matches and lower in cross-matches.
We model contracting imperfections, by postulating that skilled agents lose some of their ability rents to less productive partners. A straightforward way to implement this, is to simply assume values of g i (i, k) that support the following:
That is, in cross-matches the more productive suffers a surplus loss, while the other earns surplus.
In self-matches, skilled agents share the surplus, while unskilled partners earn no surplus. 9
The abstraction of the model allows us to work with a theoretical environment where incentives 7 This is a standard way of modeling informational asymmetries in bilateral matches (e.g. Williamson and Wright, 1995) , and can be interpreted as a noisy signal. It may be taken to capture the efficiency of a publicly observable testing procedure used to ascertain the productivity of those schooled. 8 Teams are naturally interpreted as Þrms (e.g. Kremer and Maskin, forthcoming) . Their short duration and random sorting makes explicit the presence of information frictions, and the short-run nature of contracts. 9 E.g., suppose agents split equally the Þrm's output, given g(s, s) > 2us > g(s, n) > us + un > g(d, n) = g(n, n) = 2un, where g(i, k) is the utility associated with consumption of the entire output of the (i, k) Þrm.
to earn skills, positive external effects from skill acquisition, and incentives to free-ride, by underinvesting in skills, are very intuitive. This simplicity, we stress, is not a liability as the key results are robust to richer (and more complex) speciÞcations that preserve the following features: (i) a worker's human capital is an increasing function of his effort while in school, (ii) own productivity is imperfectly observed by Þrms, at least in the early stages of the worker's career, and (iii) workers known to be more productive are better compensated, i.e. skill commands a premium. Furthermore,
by not formalizing speciÞc trade mechanisms, we achieve (i) tractability, as it is the outcome of the contracting procedure, not the procedure itself, that matters in making education choices, and (ii) can set aside inefficiencies linked to potential 'holdup' problems in skills investment.
Symmetric Stationary Equilibria.
We study stationary equilibria, where individuals adopt symmetric Nash strategies taking market payoffs and strategies of others as given. Equilibrium decisions are individually optimal, timeinvariant, and identical for identical agents. All actions are based on the correct evaluation of the gains associated with each possible match, strategies of others and distributions.
Denote the stationary equilibrium educational choices by δ ∈ [0, 1], the probability that an agent acquires a degree at the beginning of life, and σ ∈ [0, 1], the conditional probability that the agent also invests in skill. Let ω ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a skilled agent proposes to set up a Þrm with someone whose skills are unrecognized. Let © δ 0 , σ 0 , ω 0 ª be the individual best responses, when she takes as given the strategies of others. Hence, we let P s = δσ denote the equilibrium proportion of those who are skilled in the population, and P d = δ(1 − σ) the equilibrium proportion of those who have only a degree, so that P d + P s = δ is the educated population, in equilibrium.
Finally, let V i denote the expected stationary lifetime utility of an agent in state i = n, d, s.
Equilibrium Strategies
Consider a representative agent. Because the choice of education and skill are intertwined, we break up the problem in two parts, moving backward. That is, contingent on investing in the educational opportunity, we Þrst discuss her decision of investing in skill. Given the strategies of all others {δ, σ, ω}, she acquires skill if it improves her expected lifetime utility, over that associated to mere ownership of a degree i.e.:
Moving one step back, standard reasoning implies that her optimal choice of schooling must satisfy:
Now suppose skill accumulation is expected to take place in equilibrium, P s > 0. Recall that those unskilled earn surplus in cross-matches but none in self-matches. It follows that the less productive agent always proposes to team up with someone who has or might have skills, while we assume it does not otherwise (a small transaction cost would endogenize this).
Since G s (s) > 0, someone skilled strictly prefers to form a production partnership when she is aware of being in a self-match. Because G s (d) < 0, however, she does not knowingly participate in cross-matches. When her partner's skills are unobserved she proposes market production if her interim participation constraint, non-negativity of her expected surplus, is satisÞed. Her optimal choice must satisfy:
The expected market surplus from teaming up with an educated agent of unobserved skill has two
, is positive. It is the expected gain from getting a good job, i.e. joining in a very productive Þrm. The second,
, is negative and reßects the losses she will suffer ex-post if, with probability P d , she joins a less productive partnership. Aggregate consistency in equilibrium requires
The analysis has an immediate implication. If skill accumulation takes place in equilibrium, the more productive agents must have the largest lifetime return from marketing their labor, as schemes do not appear to sufficiently reward educational achievement and greater productivity in the short run, they do so in the long-run (e.g. Bishop, 1987 , 1991 , Lazear, 1977 .
Value Functions
Following the discussion above, and letting r = 1 − βπ, standard dynamic programming techniques imply that the value functions must satisfy:
The Þrst line indicates that the lifetime ßow return to a skilled individual is determined by three components. The Þrst is positive and deterministic, as she can always produce autarkically netting period utility u s . The remaining are stochastic components, associated with the gains expected from marketing skills. The second term is the surplus expected from setting up a Þrm with partners who are known to be equally skilled. The third term is non-negative, and it captures the gain expected from matching with educated workers of unknown productivity. The other lines of (5) are interpreted similarly.
Comparing V d and V n , it is obvious that someone stands to gain from earning solely a degree, only if (i) there are skills in the economy that can sometimes go undetected, P s > 0 and γ < 1, and if (ii) cross-matches can be formed, ω > 0. Since G d (s) > 0, it may be worthwhile to undertake the educational opportunity without exploiting its productive function as a way to falsely signal possession of skills. The market recognizes this possibility and forms expectations on the extent of skill accumulation, the probability P s . Based on this assessment, the more productive workers may limit their participation in Þrms of unrecognized productivity, to reduce the potential for adverse selection. This further lowers the value of investing in skill as it lessens their 'marketability,' gauged
DeÞnition. A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a list of strategies {δ, σ, ω}, and value functions (5), and (ii) {δ, σ, ω} satisfy (2)-(4).
Existence and Characterization of Equilibria
Expression (2) underscores that a necessary condition for existence of skill accumulation is
The cost of schooling, c d , cannot exceed the largest possible net return from earning skills, max(V s ) − c s − V n . As (5) indicates, V s is a maximum when γ = P s = 1, in
In what follows we assume (6) and use a constructive approach to prove existence of equilibria. Given a set of candidate strategies, we Þnd parameter regions such that the strategies are individually optimal. We classify outcomes according to how skills are distributed. There can be a degenerate distribution of skills, P s = 0 or P s = 1, or heterogeneity in skill, P s = P * s ∈ (0, 1), in which case skills and schooling may be imperfectly correlated. If P d = 0, they are perfectly correlated: although not everyone invests in education, those who do also invest in skill. If students are indifferent to earning skills P d = P * d ∈ (0, 1), so that educated workers have heterogeneous productivity (see the table) . 
Equilibria with Full Observability
It is useful to study the case γ = 1 to identify the sources of incentives to skill accumulation, absent externalities due to informational frictions. Cross matches never lead to market production, since G s (d) < 0, so that education is undertaken with the sole purpose to raise productivity.
Individual incentives to do so exist if skills are sufficiently marketable, something that is subject to strategic uncertainty as educational choices are uncoordinated. Hence, there is a strategic complementarity that generates coexistence of equilibria, some of which are market failures.
To formalize these considerations we look at the agent's best responses. Contingent on investing in education, an agent prefers earning skills if, reformulating (1):
Going to school is optimal if, manipulating (2):
The left hand sides of (7)- (8) measure the market incentive to earn skills. It grows as more good jobs are available (P s is bigger), or with larger skills remuneration. The right hand side measures the incentives linked to mere autarkic production. It can be interpreted as the opportunity cost from sitting in autarky unskilled or with a useless degree, respectively, in (8) and (7). Two features stand out. If (8) holds then (7) does too. Hence education is always productive because the market only remunerates skills, i.e. P d = 0 always. Second, if u n < u s − rc s the market is an irrelevant source of student incentives. As skills generate surplus in autarky to owners of degrees, students would choose to raise their productivity despite the absence of a labor market, i.e. independent of skills' marketability or remuneration. The set of possible equilibria is summarized below.
Lemma 1. Let γ = 1. In equilibrium P d = 0 and:
In the appendix we demonstrate that P * s ≡
and c ≡ (u s − rc s − u n ) r −1 > 0.
Figure 1 plots P s (dark lines) against c d . In panel (a) u n = u s − rc s , so that autarky is not a source of bias in favor or against the acquisition of skills. For given costs, the extent of skill heterogeneity depends only on the incentives provided by the market. If the entire workforce is expected to be skilled, it is optimal to raise one's productivity as well to take advantage of the greater returns offered by working in very efficient Þrms. If P s < 1, however, less good jobs are available and the incentive to do so falls until P s = P * s . At this point agents randomize, as possession of skills generates market returns that only match schooling costs. If P s < P * s then, education is not undertaken. 10 Note that P * s increases in c d since greater education costs require better market opportunities for skilled workers. Note also that there is always the (self-fulÞlling) possibility of a coordination failure with no skill accumulation. When u n < u s − rc s (panel (b)) and education is very cheap, P s = 1 is the unique equilibrium, as skills guarantee great productivity gains, even in autarky. The opposite occurs if u n > u s − rc s (panel (c)), when the model is biased against the acquisition of skills, as this generates a net loss, in autarky. This is reßected in a smaller upper bound on c d , and greater lower bound on the size of the skilled population. Hence, generally there is a strategic complementarity in productivity investments when the labor market is a relevant source of incentives to skill accumulation, u n ≥ u s − rc s . In this instance three types of Pareto-ranked equilibria coexist. This is not always the case, otherwise. We summarize our Þndings as follows. Proposition 1. Let skills be observable. If the labor market is the source of incentives to skill acquisition, equilibria with and without skill heterogeneity coexist; thus, market failures may occur.
Education is always productive, and so is perfectly correlated with productivity.
DeÞne ex-ante welfare as
the weighted sum of ßow returns to all agents in the economy. It is clear that
Hence, P s = 1 is socially desirable, and heterogeneity in schooling, where agents are indifferent to undertaking the educational opportunity, is welfare-equivalent to outcomes without schooling. When skill accumulation depends on labor market returns, the three equilibria coexist. If we compare sequences of stationary economies, therefore, lower education costs are not uniquely associated to the best equilibrium. We deduce that, from a steady state point of view, selection of the socially preferred outcome is independent of the cost of education. This is due to the uncoordinated nature of education choices.
Equilibria with Imperfect Observability
We now set γ < 1 to study the possibility of free-riding behavior. We demonstrate that this depends not only on the magnitude of information frictions, but also on the cost of education, and the relative market remuneration of skills, G s (s)/G d (s). This is evident when checking the counterparts to (7)-(8). A student prefers to exploit education's productive role if, from (1):
while, from (2), investing in schooling is optimal if:
There are differences and similarities with the perfect information case.
The key difference is that a student can now be indifferent to investing in skills. Technically, (9) can hold with equality when (10) is satisÞed. The intuition is straightforward. When (10) holds, there is equilibrium skill accumulation, as the return from marketing skills (the LHS of (10)) is big.
A student, however, makes the additional investment in productivity based on the expected skill premium, i.e. the difference between the return from marketing skills or just a degree (the LHS of (9)). Information frictions, or low relative remuneration of skills, decrease the skill premium. This may lead to indifference and heterogeneity across educated workers.. The key similarity is that the labor market remains a relevant source of student incentives to earning skills, if u n ≥ u s − rc s . Earlier analysis has shown the strength of this inequality to be inconsequential qualitatively, as it does not affect the equilibrium set. Thus, we focus on u n = u s − rc s , when autarkic productivity biases are absent, but the marketing of skills is essential in expanding allocations. 11 The set of possible equilibria is described below. 1 1 Generalizations to un 6 = (us − rcs) and Gs(d) > 0 are available from the authors.
Lemma 2. Let γ < 1 and u n = u s − rc s . Then:
The Þrst key result is about the link between information frictions and skill investment choices.
We discuss it by considering equilibria where some workers are educated, aided by Figure 2 . 13 If degrees signal the worker's productivity well, γ ≥ γ H , the educated workforce is homogeneously skilled, P d = 0, as every student chooses to make education a productive endeavor (area 5). If heterogeneity results, therefore, this is only because agents are indifferent to schooling, P s = P * s . When information frictions are substantial, γ ≤ γ L , students' free-riding takes place (area 2). This generates productivity heterogeneity not only in the population, but also in the educated workforce, P d = P * d . Moderate information frictions, γ L < γ < γ H , may support both under-investment in skills or not (areas 3, 4, and 5), depending also on education costs. Note that absence of education and skill accumulation, P s = 0, is always possible. 14 All possible equilibria, therefore, coexist when education is cheap and information frictions are moderate (area 3). We sum up this discussion as follows.
Proposition 2. Let the labor market be the source of incentives to skill acquisition. Equilibria with different degrees of schooling or skill accumulation generally coexist. Skill heterogeneity in the educated workforce can occur if academic certiÞcates do not signal productivity well.
In short, this the message. Suppose student's achievement (i.e. human capital) decisions are 1 2 0 ≤ γ L < γ H ≤ 1 and cL(γ) < cM (γ), are functions of the parameters (see Appendix). 1 3 {Ps, P d } = {0, 0} exists everywhere, {Ps, P d } = {P * s , P * d } in 2, 3, 4, and {Ps, P d } = {P * s , 0} or {1, 0} in 3, 4, 5. As drawn Gs(s)/G d (s) < 1. As Gs(s)/G d (s) → 1, γ L → 0. Thus the Þgure with Gs(s)/G d (s) ≥ 1 is similar but areas 1 and 2 are incorporated into areas 4 and 3, respectively. 1 4 Due to earlier identiÞed strategic complementarities, this was predictable. What is interesting is the uniqueness of this outcome, in area 1. This is due to remuneration disparities, Gs(s) < G d (s). As these vanish, so does uniqueness.
separate, to some extent and for whatever reason, from schooling choices. Then it is crucial that academic certiÞcates convey information about students' achievement efficiently. To give an example, if letter grades are a signal of productivity, then grade inßation is detrimental, as it impairs the market's ability to discriminate between the more and less productive individuals.
In the appendix we further prove that, when students underinvest in skills, two kinds of heterogeneity coexist. In the Þrst, there is only heterogeneity in the educated workforce, as everyone prefers going to school, P d = 1 − P s . In the other, everyone is also indifferent to schooling. This adds heterogeneity in education, P d < 1 − P s , and lowers the number of skilled workers. 15
The Role of Schooling Costs and Remuneration of Skills
The second key result is that equilibria with educated but heterogeneously productive workers tend to be associated with economies where not only degrees convey limited information on the owner's skills, but are also easy to get:
It is obvious that everyone would desire an inexpensive degree in our model, as G d (s) > 0 reßects a fundamental inability to screen out bad partners by means of appropriate contracts. Education costs, however, pose a barrier to students' under-investment in skills, as they raise the opportunity cost from going to school. This barrier falls as the informativeness of degrees is lessened, which is why c M increases as γ falls.
The relative remuneration of skills can also greatly affect equilibrium heterogeneity. Even if hardly observable, skills can be ubiquitous in the workforce when well remunerated. To see why, suppose γ is very small but many good jobs are expected to be available, i.e. P s is large. If skills are well paid, it does not make sense to free-ride, as market output, hence the worker's utility, increases in the Þrm's skill level. Going to school to just get a degree, however, may be worthwhile if few good jobs are expected to be available, or when, despite the presence of many good jobs, skills are poorly compensated. 16 We sum up this discussion as follows.
Corollary 1. Equilibria where students underinvest in skill tend to be associated with economies where the cost of education, and the relative market remuneration to skill are small.
Corollary 1 makes the following point. Suppose that, for whatever reason, the educational system conveys noisy information about the student's achievement. Then thinking that affordability of education is the catalyst to reaching greater productivity in the economy, is a naive notion. The key is better motivation to achievement, in particular in the form of market incentives to the acquisition of skills.
In the appendix we further prove that economies with low education costs admit the smallest steady state skill level. To illustrate the result, consider sequences of stationary economies with unequal schooling costs. Figure 3 reports the proportions of skilled workers, P s, in all possible equilibria, when γ cuts areas 3 and 4 of Figure 2 . Degenerate skill distributions correspond to the dark lines at 0 and 1, and there is heterogeneity otherwise. The upward sloping P H reßects the equilibrium {P s , P d } = {P * s , 0}, with skills perfectly correlated to education. The other curves indicate skill inequality across educated workers, {P s ,
As noted earlier, two kinds of heterogeneity coexist: either everyone has a degree, P * s = P j,1 where j = L, M, or not, P * s = P j,2 (upward sloping as education strategies respond to c d ). Finally, there are two sets of lines, since skilled agents randomize on matching only if schooling is inexpensive. That is, ω ∈ (0, 1) when P * s = P L,1 or P * s = P L,2 , else ω = 1. The link between education costs and students' underinvestment in skills is obvious from a comparison of the equilibria in which everyone earns a degree, i.e. the horizontal segments in Figure 3 . Economies with low education costs admit the smallest steady state skill level, P j,1 < 1 when c d < c L . The result is even stronger if we extend comparison to stationary economies in which not everyone goes to school (sloped segments), as P H < P j,2 < P j,1 for all j. We note that P H is the smallest because ability rents are never lost in economies where education and skills perfectly correlate. Thus, a smaller number of good jobs is sufficient to encourage investment in a productive education, relative to economies where educated workers are expected to be heterogeneous.
The Marketability of Skills and Welfare
The third signiÞcant aspect of the analysis once again concerns economies where degrees are easy to get, but do not provide good information on the owner's skills. These features tend to sustain equilibria in which skills are marketable with difficulty, and so the labor market does not function well. This reduces the gains from investing in a productive education, and hence societal welfare.
The intuition is simple. Consider why anyone would acquire ill remunerated skills when degrees are cheap, provide little information on productivity, and educated workers are heterogeneous (areas 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 2) . The incentive to free-ride in these circumstances, is strong. Recognizing the potential adverse selection problems, skilled workers counter them by choosing to randomly join Þrms of uncertain productivity (ω ∈ (0, 1) in areas 2 and 3). This behavior prevents the incentive to free-ride from getting out of hand as it lowers the matching rate of educated workers, both skilled and unskilled. 17 Hence, equilibria with a skilled workforce can be sustained in economies with greater information problems if matching rates are lower (ω falls as γ drops, see the appendix).
Proposition 3. Consider economies where academic certiÞcates do not signal productivity well.
Low education costs support steady states where skills are the least marketable, and welfare is lower.
To see how skills' marketability affects welfare, recall that P s = 1 is socially preferred with welfare given by W (1) = u s + G s (s) − r(c d + c s ). Equilibria with education heterogeneity are welfare-equivalent to outcomes where no one goes to school as under perfect information. Now that γ < 1, however, we must also rank those equilibria where productivity heterogeneity arises despite existence of a uniformly educated workforce, i.e. {P s , P d } = {P * s , P * d } and P d = 1 − P s . In this case we prove in the appendix that
Hence, in economies where education opportunities are undertaken, lower W are associated with lower costs, as c d < c L supports the smallest P * s and ω < 1 (see Figure 3 ). This discussion suggests that focusing attention solely on subsidization of private costs of schooling may be an ineffective way to sustain equilibria with greater average skill level, in the long run. 18 In fact, it may be counterproductive within the context of environments where market incentives for academic achievement (i.e. skill accumulation) and informativeness of degrees are both limited.
These are preeminent features of the U.S. experience with respect to high-school education, for example, as indicated by several observers (see the survey of Owen, 1995) .
Concluding Remarks
We have built a model where education's productive role is endogenous, and shown the theoretical ramiÞcations of separating human capital accumulation from educational investment decisions.
By treating them as complementary choices, we have demonstrated the existence of equilibria with skill heterogeneity in the educated workforce, despite ex-ante homogeneity. The endogenous imperfect correlation between education and skill represents a market failure characterized by overinvestment in education but under-investment in skill.
Two features of our economy provide incentives to earning a degree while under-investing in skill. First, degrees cannot perfectly communicate the productivity of their owners, but only certify the undertaking of the educational opportunity. Second, contract imperfections allow the unskilled to capture some ability rents, in the short-run. The extent of these market imperfections affects the market premium to skill. Together with the schooling cost, they inßuence the effectiveness of education in increasing the workforce's productivity level.
To the extent that the frictions present in our model economy are relevant features of naturally occurring economies (and there is reason to believe they are 19 ), our study has several conceptual implications. With respect to education policy, the intuition we have developed suggests a key role for a greater provision of incentives to educational achievement, both from the market but also the educational system. In particular, the analysis suggests that an increased public effort to lower the private cost of education may be ineffective in improving the workforce's skills when not complemented by incentives to student performance. Second, it suggests a key role for policies directed at diminishing informational asymmetries, for example by increasing education standards or the informativeness of academic certiÞcates.
The study leads also to interesting parallels about the possible role of technological change favoring skilled workers in explaining the increase in wage inequality experienced in the U.S. (e.g. Bound and Johnson, 1992, Katz and Murphy, 1992) . Our model suggests this may be viewed as the rational response of a market which, by increasing the relative remuneration to skill, has attempted to bypass the educational sector's inability to provide sufficient incentives to fully exploit its productive function.
Because of the abstract nature of our work, ours is clearly not meant to be a comprehensive study of education's role in promoting human capital accumulation. We do think, however, that the approach adopted can provide a useful conceptual framework in developing intuition about the ramiÞcations of endogenizing education's productive role. A natural next step is to formally model a private education sector where institutions arise endogenously and choose their services' quality to maximize their proÞts. By endogenizing the quality of education, this exercise could help us identify factors which encourage skill accumulation. mixed strategies by a star superscript, i.e. σ * , ω * , δ * ∈ (0, 1). From (1) and (2) it follows that
Both cannot be satisÞed.
this proves the Þrst rows of the bracketed expressions. 0 < P s < 1 requires δ, σ > 0 and one or both less than 1. We rule out δ, σ > 0 and both less than 1 since in this case P d > 0. We next rule out δ = 1, 0 < σ < 1. Given δ = 1, (11) shows σ = a Gs(s) . Putting this and δ = 1 into (12), δ 0 = 1 requires rc d < 0 which violates our assumption.
Thus only δ = 1, 0 < σ < 1 can be an equilibrium with 0 < P s < 1. Given σ = 1, (12) shows that
Gs(s) so P s = P * s . We verify that σ 0 = 1 is a best response by putting σ = 1, δ = We set the stage for Lemma 2 by discussing functions of γ used in proving existence of equilibria.
Lemma A. DeÞne the functions
omitting the argument, when understood, and the constants
Furthermore, σ ω and σ 1 are both decreasing in γ, whereas, if γ < γ H , then ω * is increasing in γ.
Proof of Lemma A. Note that γ L and γ H are decreasing in
It is a strictly increasing function in γ, and such
Consider the case where σ ω , σ 1 > 0 (which must hold if they correspond to equilibrium strategies). Rearrange
It can be shown that σ ω and σ 1 are decreasing in γ, and ω * is increasing in γ when γ < γ H .¥ Proof of Lemma 2. Let a = 0.
Case {0, 0}: Under the conjecture σ = 0 then P s = 0, which in turn implies ω = 0 (from (3)). It follows from (9) that σ 0 = σ = 0 (so P s = 0) is a symmetric equilibrium. From 2 and 5,
is an equilibrium when σ = 0. Therefore, when a = 0, then P s = 0 with P d = 0. This proves the Þrst row of the bracketed expression.
Cases {P * s , 0} or {1, 0}: P d = 0 requires σ = 1. Under the conjecture σ = 1, ω = 1 (from(3)), and
is a necessary condition for σ = 1. From (10), δ > 0 is individually optimal if it satisÞes
The following are equilibria when σ = 1 :
and
0 (which satisÞes (13)), where
satisÞes (14) with equality. It follows that, when a = 0, the following are equilibria: P s = 1 with
and ω = 1). This proves the third row of the bracketed expression.
It is immediate that δ > 0 is necessary for σ = σ * . Because σ = σ * only if V d = V s − c s , using (10)
must hold as a strict inequality when δ = 1 is a symmetric equilibrium, and as an equality when
must hold as a strict inequality when ω = 1 is a symmetric equilibrium, as an equality when ω ∈ [0, 1], and must be violated when ω = 0 is an equilibrium. Given σ = σ * , we have to consider
Þve different combinations of the remaining variables:
Case ω = ω * , δ = δ * : In this case P s = P * s = δ * σ ω . Here (16) and (17) must hold with equality.
Solving the system of equations (15), (16), and (17) we obtain:
and note that the denominator of c M is positive when γ < γ H . It follows that, when a = 0, the following is an equilibrium if
Case ω = 1, δ = 1 : In this case P s = P * s = σ 1 . Both (16) and (17) must hold as strict inequalities. Using (15), σ = σ 1 , hence σ ∈ (0, 1) if γ > γ L . Next, (17) holds as a strict inequality
in which case
γ L < γ < γ H is sufficient for existence. It follows that, when a = 0, the following is an equilibrium if 0 ≤ c d < c M and γ L < γ < γ H : P s = P * s = σ 1 and ω = 1 with P d + P s = 1 (i.e. σ = σ 1 , δ = 1 and ω = 1).¥ Proof of Proposition 2. Existence of the different equilibria follows from Lemma 2. From Lemma A, note that c H > c M > c L when γ L < γ < γ H . From Lemma 2, if 0 < c d < c L , then γ L < γ < γ H satisÞes the existence condition for all of all equilibria described in it. Hence coexistence of all equilibria occurs when c d < c L and γ L < γ < γ H . Also from Lemma 2, equilibria with P d = P * d can exist if γ < γ H , i.e., if the degree is sufficiently noisy.¥ Proof of Corollary 1. Lemma 2 implies P s = P * s , P d > 0, and ω ∈ {ω * , 1} only if 0 < c d < c L and γ < γ H , or 0 < c d < c M and γ L < γ < γ H . Since c L < c M when γ < γ H , then c d < c L and γ < γ H are sufficient to support P d > 0.
Lemma 2 implies that P s ∈ {P * s , 1} , P d = 0, and ω = 1 if 0 < c d < c H and γ > γ L . Hence, c M < c d < c H is sufficient to rule out an equilibrium with P d > 0. When that is the case γ > γ L is sufficient to guarantee existence of an equilibrium with P s ∈ {P * s , 1} and P d = 0. To see that these equilibria are associated with economies where the market remuneration to skill is small, note from Lemma A that both γ L and γ H decrease in G s (s).
We now prove that economies with low education costs admit the smallest steady state skill level. Therefore, consider all possible equilibria where P s > 0, and use the results contained in the proofs of Lemmas A and 2.
First, consider the equilibria where P s + P d = 1, i.e. everyone has an education. Three such equilibria exist, depending on the cost c d . Their skills levels are, respectively: (i) P s = 1 (an equilibrium for c d < c H ), (ii) P s = P M,1 = σ 1 < 1 (an equilibrium for c d < c M (γ)), and (iii) P s = P L,1 = σ w < 1 (an equilibrium for c d < c L (γ)). Note that σ 1 and σ ω are not functions of c d .
Second, consider equilibria where P s + P d < 1, i.e. there is heterogeneity in education. Three such equilibria exist, depending on the cost c d . Their skills levels are, respectively: (i) P s = P H = Notice that P j,1 and P j,2 coexist, that P j,1 > P j,2 , j = L, M, and that P H and P j,2 fall as c d falls. We conclude that stationary economies with low education costs admit the smallest steady state skill level.¥ Proof of Proposition 3. We prove that equilibria where skills exist, but are the least marketable, occur when c d is the smallest. That is when P s > 0, then P s [γ + (1 − γ)ω] falls as c d falls.
Use the proof of Corollary 1, and focus on equilibria where P s > 0. Consider outcomes where P s + P d = 1. It is obvious that skills are the most marketable when P s = 1. Compare the two remaining cases, when P * s can be either P L,1 or P M,1 , and recall that when P * s = P M,1 then ω = 1. The inequality P L,1 [γ + (1 − γ)ω * ] ≤ P M,1 can be reduced to
The inequality holds strictly for γ = 0, and does not for γ = 1. The RHS, which is positive, falls in γ. The LHS, which may be positive, decreases in γ, for γ <
s) > 0 since surpluses from production must be positive) and increases beyond that point. Because at γ = 0 (resp. γ = 1) the LHS is smaller (resp. larger) than the RHS, and because both sides are quadratic in γ, it follows that they are equal at exactly one pointγ ∈ (0, 1).
Evaluating the inequality at γ = γ H , shows thatγ = γ H (note that G d (s)−γ H (G d (s)+G s (s)) = 0).
It follows that the inequality holds for all γ ≤ γ H . Now consider also the outcomes where P d + P s < 1. It is obvious that lower marketability can be associated to smaller costs, as P j,1 > P j,2 j = L, M and because P H , P M,2 , and P L,2 fall as c d falls.
Finally, when P s + P d = 1 it is easy to show that:
where either P * s = P L,1 or P * s = P M,1 . Note that W (P L,1 ) < W (P M,1 ) whenever P L,1 ω * < P M,1 . This latter inequality follows from P L,1 [γ + (1 − γ)ω * ] ≤ P M,1 since γ + (1 − γ)ω * > ω * . The inequality W (P M,1 ) < W(1) follows from u n + (1 − γ)P 
